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Title of the research paper:   Risk Analysis of Fire/ Explosion to the LNG 
Fuelled Passenger Ferries 
 
 
Degree:                      MSc 
 
 
The research paper is a study of fire/explosion risk on the LNG fuelled passenger 
ferries. The principal of FSA methods in the IMO guideline is followed and 
techniques of Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are used in the study.  
The development of LNG fuelled passenger ferries around the world is introduced 
briefly at first, their specific design, arrangement and related safety requirements are 
discussed, the major LNG related hazards are also represented in the paper. In Step 1 
of hazard identification, the potential hazards of fire/explosion on LNG passenger 
ferries are identified and ranked according to the different operation phases of the 
ship by the PHA. In Step 2 of risk analysis, a quantitative assessment to the high 
risks of fire/explosion and related scenarios are conducted by setting up risk models, 
some assumptions and results from other related reports and study are used in the 
calculations. 
Based on the analysis to the high risk areas of fire/explosion on the LNG fuelled 
passenger ferries, potential measurements to reduce the risks are recommended, and 
some suggestions for the safety administration are put forward. 
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LNG is a kind of clean energy and an alternative fuel to the fuel oil applied on board. 
It is an efficient way to eliminate the emission of SOx and particular matters of ships, 
and could cut down the emission of NOx and CO2 by about 80% and 20% 
respectively compared to the high sulphur residual fuels (BV, 2001). 
 
LNG firstly has served as a marine fuel since 1964 on the LNG carriers by using the 
boil-off gas, and was utilized in the boiler or duel fuel engines (Herdzik, 2011, 
p.169). Under the background of stricter international regulations and regional 
legislations on the ship emission control as well as high oil price, a rapid 
development of LNG as a fuel source on the other type of vessels can be seen in the 
past decade, especially on the passenger ferries and cargo ships engaged in coastal or 
short sea transportation. On the other hand, because of the special characteristics of 
LNG, it brings many concerns and doubts on the safety issues as a new type of fuel 
on the ships during the application. Many risks such as cryogenic damage, fire/ 
explosion should be assessed in the operation and safety management. 
 
1.2 Objectives and scope 
 
This paper is intended to investigate the causes of fire/explosion risks during the 
operation of LNG fuelled passenger ferries and identify their consequences to the 
crew and passengers on board to the possible extend, to recommend mitigation 
measures in the safety management.  
The LNG fuelled passenger ferries with dual fuel engines or gas engines which are 
regulated by the IMO “Interim guidelines on safety for natural gas-fuelled engine 
installations in ships” are in the scope of study. The fire/explosions caused by 





The methodology introduced in Step1 and Step2 of formal safety assessment of IMO 
guideline was followed. Scenarios and risk models of fire/explosions were set up 
based on the LNG special hazards, ship design and arrangements as well as different 
operation phases of the ship. Because of the limited historical statistics and data of 
LNG fuelled ferries as a new type of ships, literature reviews and other risk 
assessment reports and studies on the LNG carriers and passenger ships are referred 
and utilized in HAZID session and quantification of the frequency and fatalities to 
the possible extend. 
 
According to the IMO guideline on the formal safety assessment (FSA) (IMO, 2007, 
p.5), the following steps should be followed and the risk management process is 
shown in Figure 1: 
1. Identification of hazards; 
2. Risk analysis; 
3. Risk control options; 
4. Cost benefit assessment; 






















Chapter Ⅱ Brief Introduction to the LNG Fuelled Passenger Ferries 
 
2.1 LNG fuelled passenger ships around the world 
The car ferry “Glutra” finished in 2000 was the first LNG fuelled passenger ferry in 
the world. Since then, a number of LNG passenger ships of similar type were built, 
most of them are in Norway. Up to June of 2012, there were 30 LNG fuelled ships in 
operation and 32 confirmed LNG new builds of the world, as shown in Table 1 and 
Table 2 (DNV, 2013). Most of the LNG fuelled passenger ships are engaged in short 
sea or coastal transportation. 
The world’s largest LNG fuelled passenger vessel “Viking Grace” was delivered in 
January of 2013, which was constructed for the Viking Line to operate in Finland, 
Sweden and along the Baltic countries. It has a capability for about 2800 passengers, 
200 crew, 1300 lane meters for trucks and 500 lane meters for cars (Washington, 
2011). 
High speed LNG catamaran had been under construction in Australia and planned to 
go into service in 2012 between Buenos Aires and Montevideo. It will be dual fuel, 
capable of operating on LNG or diesel, and will have capacity for 153 vehicles, 
1,000 passengers, and have speeds up to 50 knots (Washington, 2011). 
 
However, many more countries seem eager to use LNG (and CNG) as alternative 
ships fuel. A demonstration project has been started for operation of LNG fuelled 
riverboats at the Yangtze River in 2010 under the cooperation of China MSA, CCS, 
ship owners and LNG supplying company. According to the estimation of IMO, 







Table 1   LNG fuelled ships in operation worldwide 
       (Up to June of 2012, source: DNV) 
 
Year Type of vessel Owner Class Year Type of vessel Owner Class 
2000 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 2010 Patrol vessel REM DNV 
2003 PSV Simon Møkster DNV 2010 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 
2003 PSV Eidesvik DNV 2010 Patrol vessel REM DNV 
2006 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 2010 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 
2007 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 2010 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 
2007 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 2010 Car/passenger ferry Fosen Namsos Sjø DNV 
2007 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 2011 PSV DOF DNV 
2007 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 2011 Chemical tanker Tarbit Shipping GL 
2008 PSV Eidesvik Shipping DNV 2011 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 
2009 PSV Eidesvik Shipping DNV 2011 PSV Solstad Rederi DNV 
2009 Car/passenger ferry Tide DNV 2012 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 
2009 Car/passenger ferry Tide DNV 2012 PSV Eidesvik DNV 
2009 Car/passenger ferry Tide DNV 2012 PSV Olympic Shipping DNV 
2009 Patrol vessel REM DNV 2012 PSV Island Offshore DNV 
2009 Car/passenger ferry Fjord1 DNV 2012 General Cargo Nordnorsk Shipping DNV 
 
 
Table 2  Confirmed orderbook of LNG newbuilds 
                            (Up to June of 2012, source: DNV) 
 
Year Type of vessel Owner Class Year Type of vessel Owner Class 
2012 PSV Eidesvik Shipping DNV 2013 Ro-Ro Norlines DNV 
2012 Ro-Ro Sea-Cargo DNV 2013 Ro-Ro Norlines DNV 
2012 Ro-Ro Sea-Cargo DNV 2013 RoPax Viking Line LR 
2012 High speed RoPax Buquebus DNV 2013 Tug Buksér& Berging DNV 
2012 PSV Island Offshore DNV 2013 PSV Harvey Gulf Int. Marine ABS 
2012 PSV REM DNV 2013 PSV Harvey Gulf Int. Marine ABS 
2012 Car/passenger ferry Torghatten Nord DNV 2013 Patrol vessel Finish Border Guard GL 
2012 Car/passenger ferry Torghatten Nord DNV 2013 Car/passenge ferry  Society of Quebec ferries  
2012 Car/passenger ferry Torghatten Nord DNV 2013 Tug CNOOC  
2012 Car/passenger ferry Torghatten Nord DNV 2013 Tug CNOOC  
2012 Harbor vessel Incheon Port Authority  2014 Car/passenger ferry Society of Quebec ferries 
 
2013 RoPax Fjordline DNV 2014 Car/passenger ferry Society of Quebec ferries  
2013 RoPax Fjordline DNV 2014 Tug Buksér & Berging DNV 
2013 General Cargo Eidsvaag DNV 2014 PSV Harvey Gulf Int. Marine ABS 
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2013 Car/passenger ferry Norled  2014 PSV Harvey Gulf Int. Marine ABS 
2013 Car/passenger ferry Norled  2014 PSV Remøy Shipping  
 
 
2.2 Ship design and arrangements 
Because of the use of LNG as fuel on board, the ship design and arrangements of 
LNG fuelled ferries should comply with the specific requirements of IMO 
regulations and Class Society rules to the gas-fuelled ships, and also should satisfy 
the general requirements to the all passenger ships. The specific ship design and 
arrangements of LNG fuelled ferries mainly include: 
 
2.2.1 LNG fuel tanks 
The energy density of liquefied natural gas (LNG) increases by 600 times compared 
to its gas state at the normal pressure and room temperature, but it is only about half 
the energy density of oil. So the space for the LNG is larger than for fuel oil on board. 
In the existing LNG fuelled ships, the LNG is stored in cylindrical, double-wall, 
vacuum insulated stainless steel tanks, the tank pressure usually is less than 5 bar and 
the typical size is less than 200m3 (Danish EPA, 2010, pp. 23-25). 
 
Figure 2  The LNG tank sizes for some selected ships already built or under construction 
(Source: Danish EPA) 
 
According to the requirements of IMO “Interim guidelines on safety for natural 
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gas-fuelled engine installations in ships”, LNG fuel tanks should be an independent 
tank designed in accordance with Chapter 4 of the IGC Code, and the height of outlet 
from the pressure relief valves as well as the safety distance from air intake, air outlet, 
opening and furnace installation are required. LNG fuel tanks could be located on 
open deck or in enclosed space if fulfill certain requirements. For passenger ships, 
the LNG fuel tanks should be located at least B/5 from the ship’s side when on open 
deck; LNG fuel tanks with a maximum acceptable working pressure of 10 bar may 
be located in enclosed space, and gas storage tanks should be located as close as 
possible to the ship centerline: minimum B/5 from the ship side, minimum, the lesser 
of B/15 and 2 m from the bottom plating, and not less than 760 mm from the shell 
plating( IMO, 2009, p.19), just as showed in Figure 3 . 
 
Figure 3  The gas tank location of the LNG fuelled ships ( Source: DNV) 
 
2.2.2 Engine room safety concepts  
According to the IMO interim guidelines on the gas fuelled ships, two alternative 
system configurations may be accepted: Gas safe machinery space and 
ESD-protected machinery space.  
In the Inherently Gas Safe Engine Rooms, the space is considered gas safe under all 
conditions, normal as well as abnormal conditions (IMO, 2009, p.15). All gas supply 
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piping within machinery space is double pipe/ duct which is pressurized and filled 
with inert gas or ventilated and fitted with gas detection. The room around is an 
ordinary machinery space without special requirements. The concept is mandatory 
for high pressure piping (>10 bar), but can also be used with low pressure 
installations. 
 
   Figure 4  Double piping in the inherently gas safe engine room (Source: DNV) 
 
ESD protected machinery space is arranged that is considered non hazardous under 
normal conditions, but under certain abnormal conditions may have the potential to 
become gas hazardous. In the event of abnormal conditions involving gas hazards, 
emergency shutdown (ESD) of non-safe equipment (ignition sources) and machinery 
shall be automatically executed while equipment or machinery in use or active 
during these conditions shall be of explosion protected design (IMO, 2009, p.16). 
 
In the ESD Protected Engine Rooms, Gas detection system with at least 3 detectors 
in ER should be arranged, and two detectors read 20% LEL (lower explosion limit), 
when the detectors are activated the fuel supply automatically shuts down and all non 
explosion protected equipment is to be electrically disconnected. The pressure in gas 
supply lines within machinery spaces should be less than 10 bar and two or more 
engine rooms should be independent of each other. The Ventilation should be 30 air 
changes / hour and there are limitations of the equipments which can be located in 
the engine rooms (Deng, 2012). 
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              Figure 5    ESD Protected Engine Rooms (Source: DNV) 
 
There are also requirements on the propulsion redundancy that at least 40% of the 
propulsion power plus normal electrical power should be maintained if the gas 
supply is shut down to any machinery space due to a gas leakage. 
 
2.2.3 Bunkering  
 
IMO Interim guidelines on safety for natural gas-fuelled engine installations in ships 
provides requirements of the fuel bunkering system and distributing system to the 
gas fuelled ships (see Figure 6), there are also other related rules and regulations such 
as the CCS and DNV class rules and rules developed by the Norwegian Maritime 
Directorate for the issue. However, less experience and documentations are on the 
port and bunker operations for LNG, standards don’t cover this issue completely. 
DNV has proposed to develop standard for LNG bunkering equipment and 
procedures to ISO TC67/WG10, many companies and individuals have expressed 
indicated interest for participation (Rysst, 2011). Under the condition of miss of 
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standards, risk assessment should be followed in the safety management. 
 
There are mainly three bunkering solutions to do LNG bunkering: Truck to ship 
(TTS), Intermediate tank to ship (TPS) and Ship to Ship (STS), each method has its 
own characteristics and applicability.  
 
Truck to ship (TTS) bunkering method is the most common method today, but the 
volume of bunkering is limited each time. About 25 tonnes of LNG could be carried 
by the LNG tank truck depending on its capacity and the national transport 
regulations as well as the infrastructure of the road. If the volume of the LNG fuelled 
ships is large (>50 tonnes), other bunker methods would be better. On the other hand, 
there is a significant impact of the possibilities to parallel operation when the bunker 
operation was carried out on the quay side of the vessel, cargo and passenger 
handling might be conducted. 
 
Another common bunkering method is Intermediate tank to ship (TPS). LNG fuel is 
bunkered by pipeline directly from an intermediate LNG tank ashore. The size of 
LNG tank could vary from a few tones to several thousands of tones depending on 
the demand of LNG fuelled vessels and condition of location. But the flexibility is 
limited as the bunkering position is fixed. 
 
Ship to Ship (STS) bunkering is the feasible option on the flexibility and capacity 
compared other two bunkering methods, which could be used to bunker most kind of 
ship types, but the initial investment and operational cost would be reasonable high. 
(Algell & Bakosch, 2012, p.77) 
 
For the LNG fuelled car and passenger ferry “Glutra” of Norwegian, it has two LNG 
tanks onboard and 32 m3 each. Refueling is conducted every 4-5 days and takes 1-2 
hours for a truckload of 40 m3 of LNG. The bunkering operation is carried out when 
the ferry is at berth for night and no passengers on board. For the other LNG fuelled 
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passenger ferries in Norwegian such as Tidekongen, Tidedronningen and 
Tideprinsessen operating from Oslo, their LNG tank onboard are 29 m3 and they are 
refueled about once a week by a dedicated truck with a typically capacity of 50 m3 
(Danish EPA, 2010, p.26).  
 
         Figure 6  The bunkering system of gas fuelled ships (source: DNV) 
 
2.2.4 Hazardous areas  
 
Hazardous area zones are defined in the IMO “Inter guidelines on safety for natural 
gas-fuelled engine installations in ships”, the areas with risk of explosive gas 
atmosphere are analyzed and classified. Hazardous areas are divided into Zone 0, 
Zone 1 and Zone 2. Electrical equipments located in the hazards zones should be 
certified as explosion safe in that zone (Deng, 2012).  
 
2.3 Areas of safety concern 
 
2.3.1 LNG specific hazards  
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is at about temperature of -163 °C, and it is a clear, 
non-corrosive, non-toxic, cryogenic liquid at normal atmospheric pressure, the 
boiling point is -161.5 °C at normal conditions and the flash point is -187.8 °C , the 
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specific gravity of liquid is 0.45 and 0.6 of gas (Herdzik, 2011, p.170).  
The flammability range for vaporized LNG in air is 5% (LFL) to 15% (UFL) and its 
auto-ignition temperature is above 540 °C (Foss, 2012, pp.14-18). The types of 
potential LNG hazards of most concern by the operators and stakeholders include: 
Explosion. An explosion may happen when LNG reaches its flammability mixed 
with air and ignited or uncontrollably released from a pressurized state. If there is a 
structural failure such as puncture of the container, there would be an uncontrolled 
release. However, LNG usually is stored at an extremely low temperature (-163 °C), 
so no high pressure is required to maintain its liquid state. 
 
Vapor Clouds. When the LNG is warmed up, it turns from liquid to gas. Initially the 
gas is colder and heavier than the surrounding air and a vapor cloud would be formed 
above the released liquid. After the gas is warmed up, it would mix with the 
surrounding air and disperse into the atmosphere. The vapor clouds may be ignited 
and cause fire/explosion if it concentrates within its flammability range and 
encounter an ignition source. 
 
Pool fire. If the leakage of LNG mixed with the air is ignited by the ignition source 
nearby, there would be a pool fire above the LNG pool. The pool fire would be more 
rapid and intense than the oil fire. It could not be extinguished easily before the LNG 
is consumed up or the source of LNG leakage is cut off. The thermal radiation of a 
pool fire may cause injury to the people and damage to the property within certain 
distance depending on the scale of the pool fire (IMO, 2007, p.8).     
 
Cryogenic damage. LNG is stored at extremely low temperature (about -163℃), so it 
would cause metal embrittlement, cracking or structural failure if the containment 
systems fail to work. It also would cause frost burns to the personnel if protective 




Rapid phase transition (RPT). If large amount of LNG is leaked on water, it would 
vapor very quickly and cause a rapid phase transition (RPT). During the process, heat 
is transferred from water to the LNG at a temperature difference of about 175℃ 
(depending on the temperature of the water) and cause physical or cold explosion. It 
ranges from small pops to blasts large enough to potentially damage lightweight 
structures (Foss, 2012, p.19). 
 
Sloshing. If the LNG tank on ship is partially filled, a violent motion of the fluid 
would be caused and lead to an increased high pressure of LNG on the tank walls, 
especially in the bad weather and rough sea. 
 
Boiling liquid expanding explosions. An explosion might be caused if the LNG tank 
ruptures because that the temperature in the LNG tank is above the boiling point of 
the LNG and the pressure relief system of the tank is out of function. 
 
2.3.2 Special concerns to the LNG fuelled ships  
 
Due to the specific chemical and physical properties of LNG, special consideration 
should be taken into account in the design, construction, installation, commissioning 
and operation of LNG fuelled ships compared to the conventional oil fuelled ships. 
Risk assessments to the LNG specific hazards need to be carried out, and the 
following important aspects should be considered:     
1. Risks originating from fuel storage and gas supply system 
2. Risks related to the bunkering operations 
3. Risks related to external forces to the fuel storage facility 
4. Risks associated to collision/ contact involving LNG fuelled vessels  
The main consequences related to health and safety risks at LNG fuelled propulsion 
systems are fire and explosion (Danish EPA, 2010, p.110). 
 
2.4 Safety rules and regulations  
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2.4.1 Maritime regulations for all passenger ships 
 
IMO has developed and adopted a series of regulations on the safety of passenger 
ships, and most of the regulations are the consequences of lessons and experiences 
drawn from the major passenger ship accidents which resulted in a large number of 
life loss of the crews and passengers. (IMO, 2008, p5) 
 
The international convention for the safety of life at sea (SOLAS) is the most 
important regulation for the safety of passenger ships, which contains the basic 
construction and management requirement and covers the major areas related to the 
safety of passenger ships: subdivision and stability; fire safety; life-saving appliances; 
machinery and electrical installation; safety management, etc. There are also a 
number of mandatory codes under the SOLAS convention for the safety of ships, 
such as the ISM code, FSS code and ISPS code which have more detailed 
requirements for the safety and security of passenger ships. 
Other safety and environmental issues such as load limit of the ship are contained in 
the International convention on Load Lines ( LOADLINE) (IMO, 2005) , the issues 
of steering, lights and signals are contained in the International Convention for the 
prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREG) (IMO, 2003), the issues related to the 
training of crews on board are contained in international Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention) (IMO, 
2011) and issues of ship pollutions are contained in the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) (IMO, 2002). They are 
applicable to passenger ships as well as other types of ships.  
 
2.4.2 Regulations specific to the LNG fuelled passenger ships 
 
The International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying 
Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC code) provides a serious of requirements to the safety 
related to the ship design, construction, equipments and operations of ships carrying 
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liquefied gases for bulk (IMO, 1993). However, it is not applicable to the LNG 
fuelled ships other than LNG carriers, but it allows the natural gas which flashpoint 
is below 60℃ applied on board as a fuel. Some of the classification societies have 
developed requirements for the use of natural gas as fuel on ships based on this code (Danish 
EPA, 2010, p.59). A number of regulations of the IMO “Interim guidelines on safety 
for natural gas-fuelled engine installations in ships” also refer to the IGC code on 
some specific requirements such as the Material requirements, Arrangement of 
entrances and other openings, LNG fuel storage tanks and etc. 
The “Interim guidelines on safety for natural gas-fuelled engine installations in 
ships” was developed by the IMO to provide an international standard for natural 
gas-fuelled ships other than vessels covered by the IGC Code (IMO, 2009). The 
requirements to the LNG fuelled passenger ships in the guideline are stricter than 
other types of natural gas-fuelled ships. Its goal is to ensure the arrangement and 
installation of gas-fuelled machinery for propulsion and auxiliary purposes have an 
equivalent level of integrity in terms of safety, reliability and dependability compared 
to the conventional oil fueled types. On the other hand, the International Code of 
Safety for Gas-fuelled Ships (IGF Code) is in the process of developing by the 
concerned committee of IMO. 
There are also class society rules and national regulations for the LNG fuelled ships, 
such as the DNV and CCS publish the guidelines for the design, installation and 
survey of gas-fuelled propulsion systems. In Norway, the introduction of LNG 
fuelled ships has lead to an adaptation of the regulations set by the Norwegian 
Maritime Directorate (NMD) in 2000 (Danish EPA, 2010, p.58). However, there are 
a number of areas related to the safety of LNG fuelled ships haven’t been covered, 
such as the operation of bunkering, the specific standards on the training and 












3.1 Objective and scope 
 
The objective of this chapter is to identify the hazards related to the fire/explosions 
and related scenarios on the LNG fuelled ferries during the operation, to provide a 
list of prioritized hazards and their associated scenarios in the next step of risk 
analysis. 
 
The HAZID focuses on the hazards of fire/explosions during the operation of LNG 
fuelled ferries. The hazards of fire/explosions when ship is at yard for 
repairs/docking are out of scope. The fire/explosions caused by the terrorism attack 
also are not included in the scope. 
 
The HAZID session focuses on the LNG fuelled passenger ferries with dual fuel 
engine or gas engine, and the following operational phases are taken into account in 
this session: 
1. Loading 
2. Departing quay 
3. Under way 




3.2 Methods and techniques  
 
“Hazard” is defined as a potential to threaten human life, health, property or the 
environment. Both of creative and analytical techniques are used for the 




2. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); 
3. Event Tree Analysis (ETA); 
4. Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP); 
5. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); 
6. What if Analysis Technique; 
7. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). 
In this study, because the LNG fuelled passenger ferry is a new type of vessel and the 
historical data is limited, so the method of brainstorm and Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) were used, results from other studies of HAZID to LNG fuelled 
ships are referred. 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a qualitative technique to identify the hazards, 
assess the severity of potential accidents that might happen in a system, and identify 
measures for reducing or eliminating the risks associated with the hazards. It mainly 
focuses on identifying the weaknesses and problems of a system in its early stage of 
design, in the condition of little detailed information or few operating procedures. 




Figure 7   Framework of Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
 
3.3 The background of LNG safety incidents  
 
Since 1964, the LNG carriers have used the boil off gas of LNG as fuel onboard. 
Many LNG carriers have long and good experiences with the use of natural gas as 
fuel for the propulsion machinery, mainly steam turbines (Danish EPA, 2010, p.58). 
The maritime incidents with severe LNG releases in the history of the LNG industry 
are rare. During the 60-year history of 59,000 voyages of the industry, no spillage of 
LNG from a ship into the water which resulted from collision or grounding has 
occurred (Foss, 2012, p.64). The good design and maintenance of LNG ships reduces 
the risks of severe incidents. The containment systems also prevent the breach of 
cargo tanks and the spill of LNG.     
Based on the statistics of the U.S. Department of Energy, there are only 8 marine 
incidents worldwide that resulted in spillage of LNG in the 60 years history of the 
industry, some caused deck-plating damage under the manifold piping due to brittle 
fracture. There has never been LNG cargo related fires and LNG related fatality on 
board, all LNG-related injuries and fatalities have occurred within an LNG facility or 
ashore (Foss, 2012, p.65). The major marine LNG incidents are listed in Table 3 
Identifying object 
Data collection 






In 2000, the first LNG fuelled car and passenger ferries “Glutra” was launched in 
Norway, and up to now there are about 30 LNG fuelled ships in operation worldwide 
excluding LNG carriers. Good safety record has been kept and no injuries or 
fatalities occurred during the more than 10 years’ experience. No reported or 
recorded accidents , only some backfire in engine manifolds due to sudden change in 
load and 2 cases of blackout on new ferry's and consequential anchor dropping– 
reason not known but possible unstable gas heating. There was one heavy crash with 
quay due to failure in maneuvering system, but no problem with the LNG tank or gas 
system (Norwegian Maritime Authority, 2012). 
Table 3 Major marine LNG Incidents (source: the U.S. Department of Energy) 
Incident 
Date 

















burned  Yes  
1965 Jules Vernet  Loading No Yes Yes Overfilling. Tank cover and deck fractures. 




No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures 
1971 LNG ship Esso Brega Italy Unloading No No Yes 
First documented LNG Rollover 
incident. Tank developed a 
sudden increase in pressure. 
LNG vapor discharged from the 
tank safety valves and vents. 
Tank roof slightly damaged. No 
ignition 
1974 Massachusetts  Loading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures 
1974 Methane Progress  In port No Yes No Touched bottom at Arzew. 
1977 LNG Aquarius  Loading No No Yes Tank overfilled. 
1979 Mostefa Ben-Boulaid Ship  Unloading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures. 
1979 Pollenger Ship  Unloading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Tank cover plate fractures. 
1979 El Paso Paul Kayser Ship  At sea No Yes No 
Stranded. Severe damage to 
bottom, ballast tanks, motors 
water damaged, bottom of 
containment system set up. 
1980 LNG Libra  At sea No Yes No Shaft moved against rudder. Tail shaft fractured 
1980 LNG Taurus  In port No Yes No 
Stranded. Ballast tanks all 
flooded and listing. Extensive 
bottom damage. 
1984 Melrose  At sea No Yes No 
Fire in engine room. No 
structural damage sustained– 
limited to engine room. 
1985 Gradinia  In port No Not reported No Steering gear failure. No details of damage reported. 
1985 Isabella  Unloading No Yes Yes Cargo valve failure. Cargo overflow. Deck fractures. 
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1989 Tellier  Loading No Yes Yes Broke moorings. Hull and deck fractures. 
1990 Bachir Chihani  At sea No Yes No 
Sustained structural cracks 
allegedly caused by stressing 
and fatigue in inner hull. 
2002 LNG ship Norman Lady 
East of the 
Strait of 
Gibraltar 
At sea No Yes No 
Collision with a U.S. Navy 
nuclear-powered attack 
submarine, the U.S.S 
Oklahoma City. In ballast 
condition. Ship suffered a 
leakage of seawater into the 
double bottom dry tank area. 
2010 Montoir de Bretagne terminal France Unloading No Yes No 
The incident occurred when 
liquid passed into the gas 
take-off line during discharge 
operations. The damage 
sustained extended to part of 
the ship's manifold and its feed 
lines. 
2010 Withnell Bay facility Australia Loading No Yes Yes 
The ship suffered cryogenic 
burns when 2,000 to 4,000 liters 
of LNG were spilt. 
2011 Yung An LNG terminal Taiwan Unloading No No No 
The vessel's master decided to 
suspend the discharge and 
move the ship off the berth but 
the problems were eventually 
rectified and the vessel returned 
to complete the discharge of its 
cargo. 
2011 Pyeongtaek LNG terminal 
South 
Korea Unloading No Yes Yes 
The ship disconnected from the 
berth after what was described 
as a very small leak of LNG was 
reported around the top of one 
emergency release coupler 
shortly after a scheduled 
overhaul of the unloading arms 
had been completed. Seals and 
ball valves were replaced on the 
unloading arms and discharge 
recommenced using the 
remaining two arms. 
 
3.4 The generic model of LNG fuelled passenger ferries 
 
A generic model of LNG fuelled passenger ferries needs to be developed according 
to the IMO’s guideline for Formal Safety Assessment (IMO, 2007, p.7), taking into 
consideration of the particular ship structure and characteristics of LNG fuelled 
propulsion of the passenger ferries. 
 
The design and arrangements of LNG fuelled passenger ferries are assumed to satisfy 
the requirements of the IMO interim guidelines on the gas fuelled ships as well as the 
other requirements of IMO regulations to the passenger ships. The LNG fuel storage 
tanks are assumed to be located in the enclosed space. The ships are engaged in the 
short sea voyage in the coastal water. 
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For a generic LNG fuelled passenger ferries, the following assumptions are followed: 
1. The average number of operational days per year: 330 days. 
2. The average number of passengers on board each trip: 500 persons. 
3. The average number of crew on board: 30 persons.  
4. Operational hours per day: 16 hours. 
5. Period for bunkering of LNG: every 4-5 days, bunker operation is assumed to be 
carried out by truck load LNG when the ship alongside the berth after operation and 
with no passengers on board.  
 
3.5 Identification of fire/ explosion Hazards  
 
Peachey suggest that one way to identify hazards is to develop a flow chart of the 
operations which are decided to assess. It is necessary to list each overall function or 
activity being performed for developing the flow chart (Peachey, 1999).   
The process of daily operation of LNG fuelled ferries could be divided in to the 
following steps (Figure 5): 
1. Prepare for sailing 
2. Departing Quay 
3. Under way 
4. Arriving at port, mooring and preparing for unloading 
5. Unloading 
 
Each step of operations includes the following activities: 
 
Preparation for sailing: 
(1) The ferries moors alongside the quay, and crew keep watch on board. 
(2) Passengers embark the ships and the tickets are checked before embarkation. 
(3) The cars and trucks are driven onto the vehicle deck, and lashed by the crews. 
(3) All equipments of ships related to the safety of navigation are checked and tested 
before sailing, and the conditions of lased vehicles and cargoes are inspected. 
(4) Whether forecast on the route line is received and analyzed, the voyage plan are 
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checked and ensured. 
(5) Information is exchanged between the master and officers by a meeting or by 
radio for the understanding of the voyage.  
(6) The passengers come into the passenger cabins for a seat; drivers also leave their 
cars or trucks for a rest. 




(1) All preparation works for departure and sailing have been finished, and ramp is 
heaved up or removed and the bow door is closed.  
(2) Unberth operation: The officers and crew are in position for the unberth operation, 
and departure is reported to the VTS or port authority according to the local 
regulations. 
(3) The main engine was started and the mooring lines are cast off, the ferries usually 
leave the berth by its own thrusters and maneuverability, and the telegraph of engine 
is frequently changed for maneuvering.  
 
Under way: 
(1) Navigation in the port area: The ferry departs the quay and sails in the port area 
which is a limited space.  
(2) Navigation in the open water: The ferry leaves the port and sails to the open 
water and the speed of ship turns to be fixed. 
(3) Passenger services are provided such as catering and entertainment by videos, 
and the passengers are free to visit the non- restricted public areas of the ship. 
(4) Patrols are carried out by the crew to the areas of the ship, especially the 
passenger cabins, vehicle decks, LNG storage rooms and engine rooms. 
(5) The conditions of ship such as the indicators and alarms of the LNG fuelled 
propulsion systems are monitored from the bridge and control rooms by the officers. 
(6) The deck officers and/or captain keep watch on the bridge for the safety of 
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(1) Arriving is reported to the VTS or port authority according to the local 
regulations. 
(2) Related Information of docking operation is exchanged between the master, 
officers and crew before arriving. 
(3) Inspections to the related equipments and prepare works are conducted before 
arriving. 
(4) The ferry enters the port and all the crew are in position for the operation of 
docking. 
(5) The ferry berths alongside the quay, the bow door is opened and the ramp is laid 
down for unloading. 
 
Unloading: 
(1) The passengers disembark the ferry, and the vehicles on the ferry are unlashed 
and driven to the shore. 




(1) Information related to the operation is exchanged between the crew on board and 
workers ashore before the bunkering. 
(2) The critical equipments are inspected, preparing works such as blowing of the 
pipelines by inert gas is conducted according to the procedure requirements of 
bunkering.    
(3) The situation of bunkering is monitored during the operation to prevent the over 
pressure of bunkering system or overfill of the LNG storage tanks and leakage of 
LNG fuel. 
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(4) After the finish of bunkering, the pipelines are blown out with the inert gas and 
disconnected according to the procedure of bunkering operation.  
 
Based on the above operation activities of LNG fuelled ferries, refer to the 
SAFEDOR HAZID reports for RoPax and TNO report for Assessment of hazard 
identification study MTS Argonon, potential hazards related to the fire/ explosion of 
LNG fuelled passenger ferries are identified according to the operation phrases. 
 
Table 4    Potential hazards related to the fire/ explosion of LNG fuelled 
passenger ferries 
 
Operation Hazards Cause Consequence 
loading Fire/Explosion 
Fire starting in car because of hot breaks, internal 
electric failure and petrol leakage. 
Fire starting in refrigerating units connected to 
the ships electrical system. 
 
loading Petrol leakage Leakage from cars and trucks. Fire, explosion. 
loading Uncontrolled dangerous cargo aboard Improper cargo and luggage inspection Fire, explosion. 
Departing 
quay 
Collision with other 
ships/quay 
Current and wind. 
Inadequate port control. 
Poor knowledge of pleasure crafts/Sail ships. 
Weather conditions and swell. 
Technical failure. 
Damage and puncture of the ship 
hull and LNG fuel tank 
containment, leakage of LNG and 
fire/ explosion. 
Departing 
quay Grounding  
Current and wind. 
Swell and bad weather. 
Collision avoidance. 
Damage and puncture of the ship 
bottom and LNG fuel tank 
containment, leakage of LNG and 
fire/ explosion. 
Under way  Collision with ships 
Crossing traffic in certain areas. 
Collision avoidance. 
Technical and Human failure. 
Improper training on use of bridge equipments.  
Communication problems, such as hard to reach 
the other ship on radio. 
Hull damage and puncture of the 
ship hull and LNG fuel tank 
containment, leakage of LNG and 
fire/ explosion. 
Under way Collision with fixed objects 
 Loss of control 
Technical failure 
Human error 
Bad navigational information. 
 Incorrect information. 
Buoy out of position 
Hull damage and puncture of the 
ship hull and LNG fuel tank 
containment, leakage of LNG and 
fire/ explosion. 
Under way Grounding 
Current and wind. 
Swell and bad weather. 
Human error/Interaction between officers and 
Captain. 
Navigation equipment failure. 
Collision avoidance. 
Propulsion of steering failure (technical) during 
acceleration or deacceleration. 
Break and puncture of the ship 
bottom and LNG fuel tank 
containment, leakage of LNG and 
fire/ explosion. 
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Under way Fire/Explosion in machinery spaces 
LNG leakage and accumulation, technical 
failure, hot surfaces, Engine room design. 
Hydraulic systems in casing. 
Fire/Explosion and spread to other 
areas; 
Loss of maneuverability and 
power;  
Damage to crewmembers and 
panic on ship.  
Under way Fire in accommodation 
Use of naked flame/Cigarettes in waste bins, 
Laundry activities, 
Fire in galley/pantry. 
Portable electrical equipment 
Fire/Explosion and spread to other 
areas. 
More complex problem for the 
master and crew such as fire 
fighting and organization for 
preparing evacuation.  
Under way Fire in cargo area 
Electrical problems in vehicles 
Hull vibration may cause electrical problems on 




Open fire from such as smoking of crews 
Free surfaces. 
Fast fire escalation.  
Smoke ingress in accommodation. 
Injuries to crew members 
Docking Fire/Explosion in machinery spaces 
LNG leakage and accumulation, technical 
failure, hot surfaces, Engine room design. 
Hydraulic systems in casing. 
Fire/Explosion and spread to other 
areas; 
Loss of maneuverability and 
power;  
Damage to crewmembers and 
panic on ship.  
Docking Fire in accommodation 
Use of naked flame/Cigarettes in waste bins, 
Laundry activities, 
Fire in galley/pantry. 
Portable electrical equipment 
Fire/Explosion and spread to other 
areas. 
More complex problem for the 
master and crew such as fire 
fighting and organization for 
preparing evacuation.  
Docking Fire in cargo area 
Electrical problems in vehicles 
Hull vibration may cause electrical problems on 




Open fire from such as smoking of crews 
Free surfaces. 
Fast fire escalation.  
Smoke ingress in accommodation. 
Injuries to crew members 
Docking Contact to the quay  
Loss of control, 
- Technical failure, 
- Human error, 
- Bad navigational information. 
- Incorrect information. 
- buoy out of position 
Hull damage and puncture of the 
ship hull and LNG fuel tank 
containment, leakage of LNG and 
fire/ explosion. 
Unloading Fire/Explosion Spill from cars accumulated during journey 
High congestion of people on 
deck. Damage to cars, ship and 
passengers 
Bunkering Bunkering failure. 
Electrical "transmitters" such as mobile phones 
or ambulances. 
Human error. 
Fatigue for personnel. 
Mechanical failure 
Fire/Explosion. 
Damage to ship and crew.  
 
 
3.6 Ranking of the hazards 
 
According to the IMO guideline on the FSA, the identified hazards and associated 
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scenarios should be ranked for prioritization, a risk index could be established by 
adding the probability/ frequency and consequence indices as follows: 
Risk = Probability ×Consequences 
Log (Risk) = Log (Frequency) + Log (Consequence) 
 
The probability index and consequence index are defined in the following tables: 
Table 5   Definition of Frequency index 
PI   Frequency              Definition                           F (per ship year)   
7    Frequent      likely to occur once per month on one ship           10   
5    Reasonably    likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships              0.1  
     probable  
3    Remote       Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1000 ships   10-3 
1    Extremely     Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 years) of      10-5 
     remote        a world fleet of 5000ships 
 
 
            Table 6   Definition of consequence index 
SI   Severity     Effects on human safety   Effects on ship     S (Equivalent fatalities)  
1    Minor       Single or minor injuries     Local equipment damage       0.01 
2    Significant   Multiple or severe injuries   Non-severe ship damage        0.1 
3    Severe      Single fatality or multiple sever   Severe damage            1 
injuries 
4    Catastrophic  Multiple fatalities               Total loss               10 
 
The following table is the risk matrix based on the above tables. 
 
Table 7    Risk index (RI) 
                   Severity (SI) 
  1 2 3 4 
FI Frequency Minor Significant Severe Catastrophic 
7 Frequent 8 9 10 11 
6  7 8 9 10 
5 Reasonably probable 6 7 8 9 
4  5 6 7 8 
3 Remote 4 5 6 7 
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2  3 4 5 6 
1 Extremely remote 2 3 4 5 
 
After the identification of accidents, the causes could be grouped in terms of human 
error, hardware failures, external events, and so on. The ‘‘fire’ accident subcategories 
are listed as follows: 
1. Bridge 
2. Accommodation areas 
3. Vehichle deck 
4. Machinery spaces 
 
The ranking of hazards of fire/ explosion of LNG fuelled passenger ferries in the 
different phrases of operation could be carried out using the Probability and 
Consequence Scales defined before and results is shown in the Table 8 as follow: 
 
Table 8   Fire Subcategories rankings by the Risk Matrix 
Operation            Loading   Departing Quay   Under way   Docking    Unloading 
Accident subcategory 
Bridge                F1/S1=2     F1/S1=2              F1/S1=2       F1/S1=2         F1/S1=2 
Accommodation        F2/S2=4       F4/S3=7              F4/S3=7       F4/S3=7         F2/S2=4 
Vehicle deck           F3/S3=6       F3/S2=5              F3/S2=5       F3/S2=5         F3/S3=6    
Machinery spaces       F2/S2=4       F3/S3=6              F3/S3=6       F3/S3=6         F2/S2=4    
 
Based on the above table, the fire subcategories with risk index less than RI=5 would 
not be investigated further as their level is considered to be acceptably low. 
 
3.7 Summary 
According to the analysis above, the top rank hazards to the fire/explosion of LNG 
fuelled passenger ferries could be identified as follows: 
1. Fire or explosion during loading. 
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2. Fire in accommodation while in open sea or navigating in coastal waters. 
3. Fire in machinery spaces while in open sea or navigating in coastal waters. 
4. Fire on vehicle deck while unloading due to accumulation of fuel spills during 
journey. 
5. Gas leakage and accumulation due to over pressure, technical failure or 
operational errors. 
6. Gas leakage due to damage to the LNG fuel tank containment caused by collision, 
ground or contact. 


































4.1 Scope of study 
 
Based on the results of HAZID of fire/explosion to the LNG fuelled passenger ferries 
in the last Chapter, the high ranking hazards and associated scenarios would be 
investigated in more detail. The risk of loss of life among the passengers and crew on 
board would be estimated to the possible extend by calculating of Individual Risk, 
the Potential Loss of Life in each identified scenario.     
  
4.2 Method and techniques  
 
The Risk Contribution Tree (RCT) of fire/ explosion on LNG fuelled passenger 
ferries would be established, techniques of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) would be used in the session. Due to limited accident and failure 
data of the LNG fuelled passenger ferries, statistics of LNG carriers and RoPax Ships 
with similar feature would be referred.  
 
4.3 Risk model  
 
A Risk Contribution Tree (RCT) of fire/explosion is established as follows (Figure 8), 
the top-half above “fire/ explosion” is a graphical representation of the accident 
sub-category with the direct causes initiated and combined to cause the sub-category 
accidents by using fault trees, and the bottom-half below “fire/explosion” is an event 
tree representation of the development of the accident and its final results in different 
magnitudes of loss (IMO, 2007, p.40). 
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Figure 8 The Risk contribution tree of fire/explosion of the LNG fuelled passenger ferry 
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4.4 Consequence assessment 
The total risk of fire/explosion of LNG fuelled passenger ferry is assumed to be the 
sum of risk contribution from the following selected accident sub-category scenarios 
(Figure 9). The risk contribution from the “fire/ explosion in bridge” is assumed to be 
negligible in comparison based on the previous analysis. The risk contribution from 
each of sub- category scenario would be estimated based on detail risk models and 
event trees.  
 
Figure 9 Overall risk model of fire/explosion on LNG fuelled passenger ferries 
 
Due to the scarce accident records of LNG fuelled passenger ferries, and the 
probability of fire/explosion in accommodation and vehicle deck spread to the 
machinery spaces and lead to the leakage and ignition of LNG is regarded as 
negligible (IMO, 2007, p.42). Therefore the fire/ explosion in accommodation and 
vehicle deck on the LNG fuelled passenger ferries is assumed to resemble similar fire 
incidents on the oil fuelled Ro-Pax ships, the results from a review of Ro-Pax ships 
would be used ( IMO, 2008, p.44) .  
Total risk of fire/ 
explosion 
Risk of fire/explosion in machinery spaces 
Risk of fire/explosion on vehicle deck 
Risk of fire/explosion due to bunkering failure 
Risk of fire/explosion caused by collision  
Risk of fire/explosion caused by grounding  
Risk of fire/explosion caused by contact  
Risk of fire/explosion in accommodation 
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4.4.1 Fire/ explosion in accommodation   
According to the report of FSA on RoPax ships submitted by Denmark, the overall 
frequency for fire/explosion incidents estimated for RoPax of 1,000 GRT and above 
is 8.28 E-03 based on the 1994-2004 world-wide experience, and the percentage of 
fire/explosion incidents in accommodation is 24%. So the frequency of fire/ 
explosion in accommodation on LNG fuelled passenger ferries is assumed to be 1.99 
E-03. The percentage of non-escalation and escalation for fire incidents in 
accommodation is 81% and 19% respectively, and the percentage of unsuccessful 
evacuation is 20 % in this category (IMO, 2008, p.44). 
An event tree is established as follows and the frequency of different situations in the 
fire/explosion at accommodation is identified:    
 
Figure 10 The Events Tree of Fire/Explosion at accommodation 
 
Based on the above event tree, the outcomes of fire/ explosion in accommodation 
could be identified as follows: 
The average number of passengers on the LNG fuelled ferries is assumed to be 500 
persons each trip and the average number of crew is assumed to be 30 persons in the 
generic model in section 3.4. The average fatality rates for the fire incidents in 
accommodation with unsuccessful evacuation is assumed to be 8% which had been 
Fire/ Explosion at 
accommodation 
1.99 E-03 















per ship year 
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used during the North West European project study (IMO, 2008, p.45), it will also be 
used in the calculation of this study. 
Individual Risk (per year) = 7.55E-05 × 0.08 = 6.04 × E-06 
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × 7.55E-05 × 0.08 = 3.2 × E-03    
 
4.4.2 Fire/explosion on vehicle deck 
According to the report of FSA on RoPax ships submitted by Denmark, the estimated 
overall frequency for fire/explosion incidents is 8.28 E-03 and the percentage of 
fire/explosion incidents on vehicle deck is 12%, so the frequency of fire/ explosion 
on vehicle deck of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is assumed to be 9.94 E-04. The 
percentage of non-escalation and escalation for fire incidents in accommodation is 
assumed to be 71% and 29% respectively, and the percentage of unsuccessful 
evacuation is 25 % in this category (IMO, 2008, p.44). 
An event tree is established and the frequency of different situations in the 
fire/explosion on vehicle deck is identified as follows:  
 
Figure 11 The Events Tree of Fire/Explosion on vehicle deck  
 
The assumption of average fatality rates used in the North West European project 
study for the fire incidents on vehicle deck with unsuccessful evacuation also is 8% 
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(FSA, 2008, p.45), it is used in the following calculation of outcomes: 
Individual Risk (per year) = 7.20E-05 × 0.08 = 5.76 × E-06 
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × 7.20E-05 × 0.08 = 3.05 × E-03 
 
4.4.3 Fire/explosion in machinery spaces with no LNG leakage and ignition 
In this scenario, the fire/explosion with no LNG leakage and ignition in machinery 
spaces of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is similar to oil fuelled passenger ferries, so 
the results from a review of Ro-Pax ships will be used in this study.  
The frequency of fire/ explosion in machinery space of LNG fuelled passenger 
ferries is assumed to be 5.30 E-03. The percentage of non- escalation and escalation 
for fire incidents in accommodation is assumed to be 71% and 29% respectively, and 
the percentage of unsuccessful evacuation and fire uncontrolled is 5% respectively in 
this category (IMO, 2008, p.44). 
   
 
Figure 12  The Event Tree of Fire/Explosion in machinery spaces  
The assumption of average fatality rates used in the North West European project 
study for major fire incidents in machinery spaces is 0.7% and average fatality rates 
for the engine room fire uncontrolled is 75% (FSA, 2008, p.45). The outcomes are 
obtained form the following calculations.: 
Individual Risk (per year) = 7.68E-05 × 0.007 + 7.68E-05 × 0.75= 5.81 × E-05 
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PLL (per ship year) = 530 × (7.68E-05 × 0.007 + 7.68E-05 × 0.75) = 3.08× E-02 
 
4.4.4 Fire/explosion due to damage of containment caused by collision 
In this scenario, the frequency of collision of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is 
assumed to the same as RoPax ships, 1.25E-02 per ship year which is based on the 
statistics of RoPax of 1000GRT and above during the period 1994-2004; the  
percentage of collisions under way is 63% and 37% of the remaining are striking 
while at berth；in the collision incidents under way, 84% of the incidents are recorded 
as minor damage and 16% of the remains are recorded as serious casualty (IMO, 
2008, p.25). These percentages and probabilities would be used in the event trees.  
During the collision scenario, the LNG fuelled passenger ferry could be a striking 
ship or a being struck ship, the possibility is assumed to be 50%-50% based on the 
conclusion on analysis of collision casualty data (IMO, 2004). And for a striking ship, 
the probability of receiving critical damage is assumed to be negligible, so the 
distribution of this scenario to the consequence of collision is discounted. 
In the damage extent model, there are two situations: the collision damage location in 
the LNG fuel tank areas and out of the LNG fuel tank areas. According to the IMO 
guideline on the LNG fuelled ships, there are no requirements of location of LNG 
fuel tank on the distance from fore or aft of ships on the longitudinal direction. In the 
study, the location of LNG fuel tank(s) on passenger ferries is assumed to resemble 
the location of cargo tanks on a typical LNG vessel, in the following area: Between 
the foremost 2/15 of the ship and the aft 1/5 of the ship. Based on the previous study 
(Laubenstein & Mains, 2001), the probability of collision damage location 
distribution could be estimated: P (foremost 2/15) = 0.2 and P (aft1/5) = 0.15. So the 
probability of collision damage locates in the LNG fuel tank areas is 0.65.   
Based on a couple of previous studies, the possibility of critical damage caused by 
collisions with penetration of outer hull is P=0.38 for passenger ships (Olufsen & 
Spouge, 2003), and the result is assumed to be applicable to the LNG fuelled 
passenger ferries. 
Even if there is a penetration of outer hull by collision, it will not necessary be a 
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damage to the containment of LNG fuel tanks. According to the IMO guideline for 
gas-fuelled ships, the LNG fuel storage tank in enclosed spaces should be placed as 
close as possible to the centerline of ship and no less than B/5 from the ship side 
(IMO, 2009, p.19). So if the depth of a critical damage to ship side is more than B/5 
in the transverse direction, it is assumed the LNG fuel tank would be penetrated. 
From the damage statistics collected by the HARDER project in the previous study 
(Laubenstein & Mains, 2001), the damage penetration: P (b> B/5) = 0.35. 
In the condition of penetration of LNG fuel tanks and LNG leakage caused by 
collision, the LNG specific hazards might materialize, and the Rapid Phase 
Transition (RPT) is the hazard most likely happens. There are three possible 
scenarios following the Rapid Phase Transition: First, there is no ignition of the LNG 
vapour and the gas disperse into the atmosphere due to the concentration is below the 
lower flammable limit; secondly, the LNG vapour is ignited during collision by 
ignited source such as sparks from steel; Thirdly, a vapour cloud is formed and 
drifted away from the collision area, gets ignited and burns back to the LNG pool 
and form a pool fire. Based on the expert judgment, the possibility of first scenario is 
80% and the possibility of second and third scenario is 10% respectively (IMO, 2007, 
p.38).   
Based on the above analysis, an event tree could be established as follows: 
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Figure 13 The Event Tree of Fire/Explosion caused by collision 
 
The possibility and frequency of different scenarios after the penetration of 
containment of LNG fuel tank caused by collision could be identified as follows:  
 
 Table 9    Possibility and frequency of different scenarios caused by collision 
Scenarios                          Possibility              Frequency                    
Leakage of LNG vapor with no ignition  0.003485664             4.36 E-05 
Ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire  0.000435708             5.45 E-06 
Ignition of LNG vapor with pool fire     0.000435708             5.45 E-06 
 
Consequences of LNG accidents on the ferries are difficult to be estimated as no 
statistics are available. In the study, the average fatality rates of the scenario that 
ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire is assumed to be 0.7% as used for the major 
fire incidents in machinery spaces in the North West European project study. And the 
fatality rates in the scenario of ignition of LNG vapor with pool fire would refer to 
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the results from the study of LNG carriers, it is 52.5% and based on the expert 
judgment from a Delphi session (IMO, 2007, p.39). The calculation of consequence 
is illustrated as follows: 
Individual Risk (per year) = 5.45 E-06× 0.007 + 5.45 E-06× 0.525= 2.90 × E-06 
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × (5.45 E-06× 0.007 + 5.45 E-06× 0.525) = 1.54× E-03 
 
4.4.5 Fire/explosion due to damage of containment caused by grounding 
In this scenario, the frequency of grounding of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is 
assumed to be the same as RoPax ships, 9.57 E-03 per ship year. According to the 
statistics, 68% of the grounding incidents were recorded as minor incidents and 32% 
of the incidents were recorded as serious casualty (IMO, 2008, p.30). These 
frequency and probability would be used in the following event tree. 
The LNG fuel tank location areas in the longitudinal direction are assumed to be 
similar to those in the collision scenario, between the foremost 2/15 and the aft 1/5 of 
the ship. According to the grounding damage location distributions collected by the 
HARDER project, the probability of receiving damage in the foremost 2/15 of ship is 
P (foremost 2/15) = 0.2 and in the aft 1/5 of the ship is P (aft 1/5) = 0.1, so the 
possibility of damage location within the LNG fuel tank areas is 0.7 in the 
grounding. 
In the grounding damage extend model, the possibility of critical damage with the 
crack of outer hull is estimated to be 0.76 for passenger ships based on the previous 
study (Olufsen & Spouge, 2003). Even if there is a crack of outer hull of the ship by 
grounding, it is not necessarily for the penetration of LNG fuel tank. And according 
to the requirements of IMO guideline on the LNG fuelled ships, the location of LNG 
fuel tank in enclosed spaces should be no less than the lesser of B/15 and 2 m from 
the bottom plating (IMO, 2009, p.19), so LNG fuel tanks is assumed to be penetrated 
if the damage depth is more than 2 m. Based on the statistics collected by the 
HARDER project, the probability of damage depth more than 2m is : P (d> 2 meters) 
 39 
= 0.12 (IMO, 2007, p. 40), it is used in the event tree of this study.  
If there is LNG leakage in the grounding accident, the LNG hazards would 
materialize similar to the collision scenario. The difference is that LNG will leak 
from the bottom of ship compared to the leak from side of ship in the collision. 
Possible scenarios following the Rapid Phase Transition in the grounding are similar 
to the scenarios in collision: LNG vapor disperse into the atmosphere with no 
ignition because the concentration is below the lower flammable limit; LNG vapour 
is ignited but with no pool fire; LNG vapour leakage form a cloud and is ignited, 
burns back to cause a fire pool. The probability of the above three scenarios are 
assumed to be similar to that in the collision, which are 0.8, 0.1 and 0.1 respectively. 
An event tree could be established as follows based on the above analysis:     
 
Figure 14 The Event Tree of Fire/Explosion caused by grounding 
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tank and RPT caused by grounding could be identified as follows: 
 
Table 10 Possibility and frequency of different scenarios caused by grounding 
Scenarios                            Possibility              Frequency                    
Leakage of LNG vapor with no ignition    0.01634304              1.56 E-04 
Ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire    0.00204288              1.96E-05 
Ignition of LNG vapor with pool fire       0.00204288              1.96E-05 
 
In the study, the average fatality rates of the scenarios in grounding are assumed to 
be similar to those in the collision: the fatality rate of ignition of LNG vapor with no 
pool fire is assumed to be 0.7% and 52.5% in the scenario of ignition of LNG vapor 
with a pool fire. The calculation of consequence is illustrated as follows: 
 
Individual Risk (per year) = 1.96 E-05× 0.007 + 1.96 E-05× 0.525= 1.04 × E-05 
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × (1.96 E-05× 0.007 + 1.96 E-05× 0.525) = 5.53× E-03 
 
4.4.6 Fire/explosion due to damage of containment caused by contact 
In this scenario, the frequency of contact of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is 
assumed to be the same as RoPax ships, 1.25 E-02 per ship year; according to the 
statistics, 89% of the contact incidents were recorded as minor incidents and 11% of 
incidents were recorded as serious casualty (IMO, 2008, p.34). These frequency and 
percentage would be used in the event tree. 
In the study, the contact scenario is considered to be very similar to the grounding 
scenario, except for the probability of flooding, other risk distributions and 
probabilities from the contact scenario are assumed to be identical to the grounding 
scenario. And according to the previous study (Olufsen & Spouge, 2003), the 
probability of flooding in the contact is assumed to be 0.38. An event tree could be 
established as follows: 
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Figure 15 The Event Tree of Fire/Explosion caused by contact 
 
The possibility and frequency of different scenarios after the penetration of LNG fuel 
tank and RPT caused by contact could be identified as follows:  
 
Table 11    Possibility and frequency of different scenarios caused by collision 
Scenarios                           Possibility              Frequency                    
Leakage of LNG vapor with no ignition   0.00280896              3.51 E-05 
Ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire   0.00035112              4.39 E-06 
Ignition of LNG vapor with pool fire      0.00035112             4.39 E-06 
 
The average fatality rates of the scenarios in the contact are assumed to be similar as 
in the grounding: the fatality rate of ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire is 
assumed to be 0.7% and fatality rate in the scenario of ignition of LNG vapor with a 
pool fire is assumed to be 52.5%. The calculation of consequence is illustrated as 
follows: 
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Individual Risk (per year) = 4.39 E-06× 0.007 + 4.39 E-06× 0.525= 2.34× E-06 
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × (3.99 E-05× 0.007 + 3.99 E-05× 0.525) = 1.24× E-03 
 
4.4.7 Fire/explosion due to bunkering failure 
According to the statistics (IMO, 2007, p.43), a LNG carriers conduct 12 roundtrips a 
year on average and spend about 2 days of loading/unloading cargo per roundtrip. 
There have been 22 loading/ unloading incidents recorded in the industry history, and 
9 of the incidents had leakage of LNG. The frequency of loading/unloading accidents 
with leakage of LNG is estimated to be 3.2 E-03 per ship year (Vanem & Antão, 
2008, p.1333). 
As for the bunkering operation of the LNG fuelled ferries, it is similar to the 
loading/unloading operation of LNG carriers. Based on the experience of LNG 
fuelled ferries in Norway, the most common bunkering method is truck to ship, the 
ship is refueled every 4-5 days , the bunkering rate is about 40m3/hour and about 2 
hour for the bunkering peroration each time (DNV, 2013, p.23). The bunkering 
operation of LNG fuelled ferries is much more frequent compared to the LNG 
carriers loading/unloading operation, but the potential consequences of LNG 
bunkering failure might be less severe than the LNG carrier accidents as the small 
scale of volume (Algell & Bakosch, 2012, pp.106-107). 
. 
As the bunkering operation of LNG fuelled ferries is conducted when out of service 
with no passengers on board, and the related accident statistics are not available, so 
the quantitative consequences of fire/ explosion caused by bunkering failure is not 
taken into account in the study. 
 
4.5 Risk summation 
Based on the calculation of above risk models, the consequences of fire/ explosion 
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risk from different scenarios of the LNG fuelled passenger ferries could be 
summarized as follows (Table 12): 
         
  Table 12      Summary Risk Calculations of fire/explosion 
 Individual Risk (per 
year) 
PLL (per ship 
year) PLL (%) 
fire/explosion in accommodation 6.04 × E-06 3.20 × E-03 7% 
fire/explosion on vehicle deck 5.76 × E-06 3.05 × E-03 7% 
fire/explosion in machinery spaces 5.81 × E-05 3.08× E-02 68% 
fire/explosion caused by collision 2.90 × E-06 1.54× E-03 3% 
fire/explosion caused by grounding 1.04 × E-05 5.53× E-03 12% 
fire/explosion caused by contact 2.34× E-06 1.24× E-03 3% 
Total 8.55×E-05 4.54×E-02 100% 
 
The total individual risk of fire/explosion calculated by the risk models is 8.55×E-05, 
based on the assumption that the vessel at sea and the person on board for a full year. 
From the above table, we can conclude that the fire/explosion in the machine spaces 
has the highest frequency of occurring; the fire/explosion due to damage of 
containment caused by collision, contact has relatively low frequency but high 
fatality rate, and the fire/explosion caused by grounding has relatively high 
frequency of occurring.  
4.6 Summary 
The consequences of fire/explosion risk from several major scenarios on the LNG 
fuelled passenger ferries are calculated based on the risk models of event trees. Some 
of the assumptions and results from the research reports of RoPax ships and LNG 
carriers are used in the calculation of the risk models, so the outcomes of the study 
still contain uncertainties. However, due to the limited statistics of LNG fuelled 
passenger ferries, best efforts are made to provide a rational estimation of the risk 
models to the possible extend. 
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Chapter Ⅴ Recommendations 
 
5.1 Identified high risk areas and recommended measures 
Based on the above analysis on risk models of different fire/explosion scenarios, the 
high risk areas could be identified and potential measurements could be 
recommended as follows: 
1. Navigation safety. The improvement of navigation safety could reduce the 
frequency of collision, grounding and contact, would also reduce the risk of damage 
of LNG fuel tank containment and fire/explosion caused by the leakage of LNG. 
According to the previous study (Antão & Soares, 2006, p.115), human factors are 
the dominant factors towards the accidents of groundings and collisions of RoPax 
vessels, so the measurements for reducing the human errors such as the navigator 
training could be taken; on the other hand, the improvement of bridge design and 
navigation equipments such as ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information 
System), AIS (Automatic Identification System) integration with radar could be cost 
efficient options for promoting the navigation safety of passenger ships (IMO, 2004, 
p.2). 
2. Gas detecting and ventilation system. The flammable limit of natural gas is in a 
small range (5%- 15%), so the gas detecting system is very important to discover the 
leakage of LNG and give alarms to the crew timely; ventilation system is very 
critical for reducing the concentration of natural gas to below the lower flammable 
limit (LFL) if the leakage happened. 
3. Fire protection. The fire protection could prevent or slow down the fire/ explosion 
escalation from the ignition source to the other compartments or areas of the ship, 
providing more time for the evacuation of passengers as well as crew and the fire 
fighting operation. 
4. Evacuation operation and arrangements. According to the previous study (Melhem 
& Ozog, 2007, p.10), the fatality rate of personnel on board in the pool fire is largely 
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determined by the distance from the ignition source and exposure time to the thermal 
radiation of the pool fire. So the evacuation drills are needed to be carried out 
frequently to improve the efficiency of evacuation operations after the fire/ explosion 
of LNG leakage, the safety distance from the potential pool fire point to the 
evacuation point should be taken into account in the design and arrangement of 
evacuation equipments.     
5. Crew training. The LNG has specific hazards compared to conventional fuel oil, so 
the crew serving on the LNG fuelled passenger ferries should receive professional 
training on familiar with the LNG specific hazards, learn how to manage and utilize 
the LNG fuel safely in daily operation.  
6. Bunkering operation. Because of the high frequency of bunkering operation, it is a 
high risk area for the leakage of LNG and result in fire/explosion , so good practice, 
safety standards and procedures should be set up for the bunkering operation , the 
personnel involved in LNG bunkering including crew onboard and operators onshore 
should receive related training.    
7. Source of ignition. The fire/explosion is caused by the combining the flammable 
materials and ignition source, so control to the ignition source is critical to the 
reduction of fire/explosion risk on the LNG fuelled ferry. The naked fire such as 
smoking of cigarette and could be prohibited by set up no-smoking area; the 
electrical equipments fitted in the gas atmospheres should satisfy the related 
standards and prevent the sparks during operation; heat sources could be controlled 
or separated from the flammable materials.  
5.2 Suggestions for the safety administration  
The development of LNG fuelled ships is a new trend of green ships, and it also 
brings new challenges to the maritime administration, especially for the LNG fuelled 
passenger ferries which would result in a large amount of deaths if the fire/explosion 
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occurs on board. Some suggestions are put forward for the maritime administration 
of LNG fuelled ferries as follows: 
1. Specific guidelines and standards should be made for the safety of application of 
LNG fuel on board. Although the IMO Interim guidelines on the gas-fuelled ships 
has established a framework of requirements for the safety of LNG propulsion ships, 
there are still a number of specific issues such as bunkering configuration and 
operation that haven’t been covered by the regulations. International regulations may 
be developed for the specific issues during the application of LNG fuel on board, and 
the class society and maritime administration of each contating state also play a key 
role in making rules for the developing of LNG fuel. 
2. Risk assessment should be carried out for the new type of LNG fuelled ships. As a 
new type of ships, safety standards and experience for the vessel design, construction, 
installation and operation would not be available enough, so related risk assessments 
are essential to be carried out for the reduction of potential risks and improvement of 
safety.   
3. Promoting the education and training to the crew and the public. Compared to the 
conventional fuel oil, the LNG fuel is not much familiar to the crew, ship owners, 
passengers and other stakeholders of the public. On one hand, the crew serving on 
the LNG fuelled ships should receive training on LNG hazards, correct operation and 
maintenance to the gas-related equipments as well as emergency exercises. On the 
other hand, the stakeholders of the public should be aware of the LNG hazards 
correctly, and the administration should eliminate their excessive worries on the 
application of LNG fuel on board, and protect their personal safety and properties 
efficiently. 
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Chapter Ⅵ Conclusions 
 
According to the calculation of risk models in this study, the fire/explosions in the 
machinery spaces of LNG fuelled ferries have the highest frequency and fatality 
while the fire/explosions due to the damage of LNG containment caused by collision, 
grounding and contact have relatively low frequency, however the results might be 
very serious. Bunkering operations of LNG fuel is also a high risk area of 
fire/explosion to be concerned. Evacuation is very critical to the fatalities in each 
fire/explosion scenario, especially when the pool fire caused by the leakage of LNG. 
Standards and guidelines related to the specific issues of ship design, construction 
and operation should be established as the development of application of LNG fuel 
on board. Human factor is a key point to the safety of the LNG fuelled passenger 
ferries, and related training and education should be conducted to the crew and the 

























Algell, J. & Bakosch, A. & Forsman, B. (2012, December 19). Feasibility Study on 
LNG Fuelled Short Sea and Coastal Shipping in the Wider Caribbean Region. 
Sweden: SSPA Sweden AB.  
Antão, P. & Soares, C.G. (2006). Fault-tree Models of Accident Scenarios of RoPax 
Vessels. International Journal of Automation and Computing, 2, 107-116. 
Bureau Veritas (2011, March). Natural gas for passenger ships. VeriSTAR News. 
Retrieved May 30, 2013 from the World Wide Web: 
www.veristar.com/.../4596.1.Veristar%20News%20March%202011.pdf 
Danish Environmental Protection Agency. (2010). Natural gas for ship propulsion in 
Denmark. Possibilities for using LNG and CNG on ferry and cargo routes. 
Denmark: Author. 
Deng, L. (2012, June 20). Gas as a Ship Fuel – Safety, Rules & Regulations. 
Retrieved March 15, 2013 from the World Wide Web:  
www.dnv.com.cn/binaries/4%20dengling_tcm142-520657.pdf  
Det Norske Veritas. (2013). LNG fuel bunkering in Australia: Infrastructure and 
regulations. Singapore: Author.   
Det Norske Veritas. (2013). The future of LNG as fuel. Technical and infrastructure 
aspects and considerations. Retrieved April 30, 2013 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.newsfront.gr/conference4/images/stories/Presentations/Lars_Soerum.p
df 
Foss, M. M. (2012, June). LNG safety and security. Houston: Center for Energy 
Economics.  
Herdzik, J. (2011, February). LNG as a marine fuel-possibilities and problems. 
Journal of KONES Powertrain and Transport, 2(18), 169-176.  
International Maritime Organization. (1993). International Code for the Construction 
and Equipment of Ships Carrying LiquefiedGases in Bulk – IGC Code 1993 
edition (ISBN: 92-801-1277-5). London: Author. 
International Maritime Organization. (2002). MARPOL 73/78, Consolidated edition 
2002 (ISBN: 92-801-5125-8). London: Author. 
International Maritime Organization. (2003). COLREG, Convention on the 
 49 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972. Consolidated 
Edition 2003 (ISBN: 92-801-4167-8). London: Author. 
International Maritime Organization. (2004, February 6). FSA Study on Navigational 
Safety of Passenger Ships: Submitted by Norway (MSC 78/4/2). London: Author. 
International Maritime Organization. (2004, February 6). Large Passenger Ship 
Safety: FSA Study on Navigational Safety of Passenger Ships: submitted by 
Norway (MSC 78/4/2). London: Author. 
International Maritime Organization. (2005). Load Lines, Consolidated edition 2005 
(ISBN: 92-801-4194-5). London: Author. 
International Maritime Organization. (2007, July 3). FSA − Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) Carriers. Details of the Formal Safety Assessment (MSC 83/INF.3). 
London: Author. 
International Maritime Organization. (2007, May 14). Consolidated text of the 
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making 
process (MSC 83/ INF.2). London: Author 
International Maritime Organization. (2008, July 21). FSA – RoPax ships. Details of 
the Formal Safety Assessment. Details of the Formal Safety Assessment (MSC 
85/INF.3). London: Author. 
International Maritime Organization. (2009, June 1). Interim guidelines on safety for 
natural gas-fuelled engine installations in ships ( MSC.285 (86)). London: Author 
International Maritime Organization. (2011). STCW including the 2010 Manila 
Amendments, 2011 Edition (ISBN: 978-92-801-1528-4). London: Author. 
Laubenstein, L. & Mains, C. & Jost, A. & Tagg, R. &Bjørneboe, N. K. (2001). 
Updated Probabilistic Extents of damage based on actual Collision Data. In 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Collision and Grounding of 
Ships (ICCGS 2001). Copenhagen. 
Melhem, G. A. & Ozog, H. & Kalelkar, A. S. (2007). Understand LNG Fire Hazards. 
Salem: ioMosaic.   
Mullai, A. (2006). Risk Management System- Risk Assessment Frameworks and 
Techniques. Turku: Author. 
Norwegian Maritime Authority. (2012, June 14). Approval of Ships using LNG as 
 50 
fuel. Retrieved April 20, 2013 from the World Wide Web: 
http://norwegen.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_norwegen/Dokumente/Presentasjoner/lng/K
ARLSEN_How_do_authories_approve_LNG_ships.pdf 
Olufsen, O. & Spouge, J. & Hovem, L. (2003). The Formal Safety Assessment 
Methodology Applied to the Survival Capability of Passenger Ships. In 
Proceedings of RINA Passenger Ship Safety Conference. London. 
Pan, H. (2004). Research on the methods of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) on ship. 
Unpublished doctor’s thesis, WuHang University of Technology, Wuhang, China. 
Pan, L. G. & Liu, J. J. (2012, October). Liquid Natural Gas- powered Ships 
Development Research. KEJI ZHIFU XIANGDAO, 14, 192. 
Peachey, J.H. (1999).Managing risk through legislation, managing risk in shipping. A 
Practical Guide (pp.93–100).London: The Nautical Institute’s Publication. 
Rysst J. (2011, May 4). Bunkering and Operation of Gas Fuelled Ships. Retrieved 
April 20, 2013 from the World Wide Web: 
www.gasskonferansen.com/foredrag%202011/Jon%20Rysst%20-%207.pdf 
Vanem, E. & Antão, P. & Østvik, I. & Comas, F. D. C. (2008). Analysing the risk of 
LNG carrier operations. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 93, 
1328–1344. 
Washington State Legislature. (2011, August 18). LNG Study Status Report. 
Retrieved April 30, 2013 from the World Wide Web: 
www.leg.wa.gov/JTC/Documents/Studies/LNG/LNGStatusReport.pdf     
 
 
 
